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Abstract 
In recent years, pirate attacks against shipping and oil field installations have 
become more frequent and more serious. The SARGOS system provides an 
innovative solution that addresses the problem from the perspective of the entire 
processing chain; from the detection of a potential threat to the implementation 
of a response. The response to an attack must take into account multiple 
variables: the characteristics of the threat and the potential target, existing 
protection tools, environmental constraints, etc. The potential of Bayesian 
networks is used to manage this large number of parameters and identify 
appropriate counter-measures. 
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1 Introduction 
Global oil production is spread over more than 10,000 offshore fields each of 
which requires on the one hand, equipment for the extraction, processing and 
temporary storage of crude oil and on the other hand, shipping capable of 
transporting petroleum between production and consumption sites. 
 
These sites of energy production and the corresponding maritime transportation 
systems are subject to a high risk of piracy. Current monitoring systems have 
major weaknesses in terms of threat detection, and the procedures to be applied 
in the case of an attack are often particularly inefficient and inadequate. It is 
therefore essential that any system able to manage oil field security can offer 
suitable protection and provide effective crisis management. 
 
This paper first describes the issues associated with acts of piracy against oil 
fields. In response to these threats a new system was designed that offers a 
method for the planning of counter-measures. The method, which is described in 
detail, includes notably the construction of a Bayesian network based on two 
principles: the use of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Piracy 
and Armed Robbery database, and the collection and formalisation of the 
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knowledge of experts in the domain. The paper finally describes how the method 
was tested using realistic and comprehensive scenarios of pirate attacks. 
2 Piracy: an evolving risk and an economic and political 
challenge 
Offshore activity is growing rapidly. The exploitation of offshore oil resources 
currently represents about a third of global oil production. This energy resource, 
despite its scarcity, is being explored in many areas, some of which are located 
in dangerous territorial waters (notably the Gulf of Guinea) that are becoming 
increasingly unstable. The lack of effective tools for infrastructure protection 
means that actors involved in the offshore oil and gas industry find themselves 
helpless. The attacks carried out against them generate significant additional 
costs, including for example, the payment of ransoms, higher insurance 
premiums and the installation of security equipment. These additional costs 
directly affect the international price of oil [1]. 
 
Moreover, oil fields form the interface between the maritime world and the 
petroleum industry. The many and various applicable rules that constitute the 
legal status of oil rigs create a complex situation, which may generate political 
conflicts between nations particularly as the nationality of the company 
operating the platform may not correspond to the physical location of the 
installation. This raises the question of how responsibility is divided between the 
different actors charged with protecting the area. 
 
The importance of oil installations for the global economy and industry and the 
potential consequences of piracy create a strong incentive to better protect these 
assets. Although attacks against oil fields are infrequent and mostly low-profile, 
they are extremely disturbing due to the severe impact on the crew and 
infrastructure. One example is the attack on the Exxon Mobil platform [2] off the 
coast of Nigeria, which led to the kidnapping of nineteen employees and 
extensive damage to the facility caused by the explosive devices used by the 
pirates. This reflects the weakness of current anti-piracy tools. 
 
Infrastructure managers, employees and safety officers do not want to continue 
to see their ships or other assets become the subject of substantial ransoms, nor 
crewmen injured, killed or kept in extreme conditions for days or even weeks 
[3]. At the same time, insurers are unwilling to continue to provide cover for 
such high risk activities indefinitely. Finally, nations do not want to continue to 
see the price of oil affected by such events. 
 
Security on oil installations is currently assured by so-called classical tools (radio 
identification, radar, Automatic Identification Systems, etc.). These tools, despite 
their ability to detect threats, do not distinguish different types of threat (e.g. a 
fishing boat or dhow harbouring pirates and a drifting tanker) and their 
effectiveness depends on many parameters related to the environment and 
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technical and operational constraints. A new solution is therefore needed to 
improve infrastructure protection. Any new system should be capable of 
generating an alert and triggering internal and external responses when an 
intrusion is confirmed. 
 
The Graduated Offshore Alert and Response System (Système d'Alerte et de 
Réponse Graduée OffShore; SARGOS) responds to this need to protect civilian 
infrastructure vulnerable to acts of piracy or terrorism carried out at sea. The 
project aims to design and develop a global alert and response system that takes 
into account the whole chain of events – from the detection of a potential threat 
to the implementation of the response. The system can be integrated into the 
infrastructure’s operations and takes into account regulatory and legal 
constraints. 
 
This French project is funded by the National Research Agency (L’Agence 
Nationale de la Recherche); it is recognised by regional organisations and 
Aerospace Valley (a cluster of French aerospace engineering companies and 
research centres). Activities include the development of an overall protection 
system; automatic threat detection and identification; risk assessment; and 
management of an appropriate response – it therefore draws upon skills from 
many disciplines1. 
  
The diagram of the SARGOS system shown in Figure 1 demonstrates the threat 
processing cycle. Current tools make it very difficult to arrive at a threat 
diagnosis and to determine how to manage the parameters and constraints related 
to an attack. The new approach proposed here aims to overcome these 
shortcomings through the development of automated response plans that are 
tailored to the nature of the detected intrusion. 
 
 
Figure 1: Functional diagram of the SARGOS system 
                                                          
1
  SARGOS project participants include private sector organisations such as DCNS (a 
French naval shipbuilder) and SOFRESUD (a supplier of high-tech equipment to the defence 
industry), and public research centres including ARMINES (a French contract research organisation) 
and TéSA (Telecommunications for Space and Aeronautics). 
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3 The contribution of Bayesian networks to the creation of 
threat response action plans 
A detailed investigation of the issues highlights significant constraints that the 
SARGOS system must take into account in order to fully reflect the complexity 
of a situation. On the one hand, the large number of variables to be included 
(representing the threat, the target, the environment, etc.) and the dependencies 
that may exist between them suggest the development of a decision support 
system based on graph theory. On the other hand, the uncertainty inherent in 
certain variables (threat identification, intervention options, etc.) emphasises the 
need for a system based on probability theory and probabilistic calculations. 
With these two approaches in mind, a process for the automatic preparation of 
response plans tailored to the nature of the detected intrusion, based on Bayesian 
networks was explored.  
 
The response planning process aims to develop an appropriate, graduated and 
progressive response to a threat. The lack of knowledge and feedback related to 
attacks on oil platforms is addressed by the incorporation of database 
information and the knowledge and experience of experts in the maritime 
domain. This information and knowledge is then modelled with Bayesian 
networks; these tools are based on Thomas Bayes’ theorem (1), which is one of 
the foundations of probability theory [4]. 
 
                                                     P(B/A) P(A) 
                                     P(A/B) =           (1) 
                                                          P(B) 
 
A Bayesian network is a system for the representation of knowledge and the 
calculation of conditional probabilities, which can be applied to many complex 
problems [5], [6] and [7]. 
 
BayesiaLab2 software was used to build the Bayesian network. This powerful 
Bayesian network modelling tool provides an intuitive graphical interface. 
 
The SARGOS Bayesian network was developed in two stages, which are 
described below, namely: the construction of an initial network from data 
contained in a specialist database and the creation of the final network enriched 
by expert domain knowledge. 
3.1 Construction of a Bayesian network based on existing data 
The first step exploited data contained in the Piracy and Armed Robbery 
database of the IMO. This is the only existing database to contain historic (dating 
back to 1994) data on pirate attacks in the maritime environment. On 15th July, 
                                                          
2
  BayesiaLab software is developed by the French company Bayesia (http://www.bayesia.com/) 
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2011 the database contained records of 5,502 attacks and the data noted for each 
attack included: the name of the asset under attack, the number of attackers, the 
weapons used, the measures taken by the crew to protect themselves, the impact 
on the crew and the pirates, etc. 
 
From this data, the BayesiaLab software was able to automatically generate a 
Bayesian network and propose interdependencies between the principal basic 
elements [8]. This analysis made it possible to establish the main protective 
measures taken by the majority of entities attacked. They included for example: 
initiate evasive manoeuvres, activate the Ship Security Alarm System (SSAS), 
contact the security vessel, secure the crew, turn on searchlights, etc. 
 
These modes and conditional probabilities were then used to construct the expert 
network. Figure 2 shows the Bayesian network built from the information 
contained in the database. Some information, such as the longitude, latitude, 
name of the asset attacked, etc. is not included. This is due to the fact that this 
data was not specified for all attacks. 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  The Bayesian network based on IMO data 
 
A classical statistical analysis of this data provided some initial findings that 
included the following observations: most ships that come under attack are bulk 
carriers or tankers; 48% of attacks take place in international waters (due to the 
absence of security patrols); and pirates prefer to attack in numbers (68% of 
attacks are organised by teams of more than five). 
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 The network provides a very clear view of the tactics of pirates, the weapons 
they use, and above all the number of individuals involved. In addition, an 
examination of the network makes it possible to identify the principal tools and 
measures deployed by the crew of assets under attack in order to protect 
themselves, to assess the effectiveness of these tools and to define the 
probabilities of occurrence of certain types of attack. 
3.2 Construction of a Bayesian network based on expert knowledge 
The Bayesian network created from the modalities and conditional probabilities 
found in the IMO data provided a formal framework into which domain experts 
were able to integrate their knowledge in order to build the final SARGOS 
Bayesian network [9]. In this second step, experts from the maritime and oil 
domains analysed the data extracted from the Bayesian network created from 
IMO data. As the information contained in the IMO database related primarily to 
attacks on shipping, the contribution of knowledge from domain experts made it 
possible to extend the system to include oil fields: nodes and arcs were added to 
the model in order to make it as versatile as possible [10].  
 
The basic architecture of the SARGOS response planning network was 
developed through the course of multiple brainstorming sessions during which 
various maritime security experts shared their experiences and discussed the 
modalities and probabilities of the network. The final architecture consisted of 
four modules and five sub-modules (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3: Structure of the SARGOS Bayesian network 
 
In the Bayesian network, each module or sub-module consists of one or more 
nodes that receive input from and/or provide input to other nodes. Each node 
consists of a matrix of conditional probabilities that are calculated from an 
assessment of the interactions the node has with other nodes and the reality 
represented by the node itself. 
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The definition of the scope of each module is directly related to the composition 
of its constituent nodes. Module definitions include basic parameters, the overall 
danger level of the situation, aggravating factors and constraints, counter-
measures and nodes related to communication and the request for assistance. 
These modules are described in detail below. 
3.2.1 Basic parameters 
Basic parameters are static or dynamic physical data that characterise the threat 
and the target. They are the direct result of, or are derived from the intermediate 
calculations of the alert report. They represent a minimum, but sufficiently 
detailed level of modelling required for a full understanding of the threat and the 
target when considering potential responses to an attack. Basic parameters 
include, for example, identification of the threat (suspicious or hostile), the 
distance between the threat and the target and the criticality of the target (divided 
into four categories: critical, major, significant or otherwise). 
3.2.2 The overall danger level of the situation 
The overall danger level of the situation is arrived from the basic parameters. 
The grading system runs from level 1 (least serious) to 4 (most serious). This 
level and the planning of counter-measures are constantly adapted to the 
situation. 
3.2.3 Aggravating factors and constraints 
Aggravating factors and constraints are elements that are both internal and 
external to the system. Aggravating factors make it possible to take into account 
a potential deterioration in the situation and thus to anticipate potential planning 
options. They represent the environment, for example visibility and time of day. 
Constraints are represented by parameters which reflect the effectiveness of the 
response both technically and operationally. Technical constraints are directly 
related to the deployment of counter-measures – they include issues such as what 
equipment is available and the potential for remote control. 
3.2.4 Communication and the request for assistance 
Communication and the request for assistance are two key responses to a threat. 
Internal communication at the target can alert all relevant personnel (e.g., 
informing the crew master) while external communication makes it possible at 
various levels to warn the different actors involved in maritime security (request 
the intervention of the security vessel, activate the Ship Security Alarm System, 
etc.). These types of communication enable installations and shipping to prepare 
their response plan and to establish if external intervention is available. 
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3.2.5 Counter-measures 
Counter-measures comprise all the defences mobilised by the target under attack 
in order to protect itself against an identified threat. They are the actual 
realisation of the response plan and constitute the set of means and actions 
intended to normalise, as quickly as possible, the situation. Counter-measures are 
divided into five sub-modules. These reflect the concept of a graduated response 
by proposing increasingly forceful measures depending on the nature of the 
detected threat. Measures range from deterrence and small-scale repulsion, 
through repulsion, anti-boarding measures and neutralisation, to procedure 
management and securing the facility. They are described in detail below. 
 
Deterrence and small-scale repulsion measures are intended to inform the 
attacker that the target is aware of the attacker’s intentions, can follow the 
attacker and that it is not in the attackers’ interest to continue their actions. These 
measures include the ability of the target to repel an attack with low-impact 
devices such as searchlights, fire hoses or sonic cannons. 
 
Repulsion, anti-boarding and neutralisation are high-impact measures whose 
main function is to at least mitigate an attack, if not neutralise the attackers 
(while remaining within the bounds of non-lethal self-defence). These devices 
also have the advantage of providing the crew with enough time to mobilise 
other defensive measures. 
 
Procedure management is composed of two counter-measures. On the one hand, 
it involves the sounding of crew Action Stations and the reporting of crew to 
their pre-assigned post or station and, on the other hand, securing the target of 
the attack. Potential actions include: activate the Citadel, engage evasive 
manoeuvres (for mobile units and shipping), and declare the security post (a set 
of individual procedures undertaken by each crew member as necessary). 
 
Like procedure management, the SARGOS system offers a way to secure the 
installation through the planning of actions related to the control of equipment on 
the installation in order to safely stop production and prevent access to sensitive 
areas [11], [12]. 
4 Discussion 
Once the probability distribution of the various modalities has been established, 
an interesting exercise is to test the Bayesian network by simulating attack 
scenarios through the selection of certain criteria. An examination of these 
scenarios made it possible to finalise the network before integrating it into the 
SARGOS system. 
Bouejla A., Chaze X., Guarnieri F. et Napoli A., 2012 : 
« Bayesian Networks in the Management of Oil Field Piracy Risk », 
Conférence internationale Risk Analysis 2012 (8th International Conference on Risk Analysis and Hazard Mitigation), Ile de Brac, Croatie, 
WIT Transactions on Ecology and the Environment (ISSN: 1746-448X, Digital ISSN 1743-3541), 2012
4.1 Attack scenarios 
The example below (Figure 4) shows how response planning is tailored to the 
danger level of the situation and can adapt to changes in parameters representing 
the threat and the target. Specifically, it shows the results of setting parameters to 
simulate an attack on a Floating Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO) unit 
by an unknown vessel. This example shows that the danger level of the situation, 
at time T1, was 2 with a 64.68% probability of occurrence. In this case the 
counter-measures to be applied were: inform the crew master, request the 
intervention of the security vessel, broadcast a strong message by loudspeaker, 
turn on the searchlight and activate the security post. 
 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of response planning as more information about 
the situation becomes available  
 
At time T1+t the attacker has been identified as hostile and equipped with a 
highly manoeuvrable boat. The parameters that impacted response planning 
were: the ranking between the threat and the target (i.e. the time required for the 
threat to cover the remaining distance to the target), the distance between the 
threat and the target and the response time of the security vessel. The danger 
level is now 4 with a 79.79% probability of occurrence. This higher level 
requires a more forceful response, reflected in the recommended measures: 
assemble the crew, secure the installation and block access to sensitive areas.  
 
The creation of attack scenarios makes it possible to refine the probability of an 
attack and test the response of the Bayesian network by changing the parameters 
that represent the threat, the target, the environment, etc. 
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4.2 Integration of the Bayesian network into the SARGOS system 
In order to integrate the Bayesian network into the SARGOS system, a prototype 
was developed that included an alert report as input and a planning report as 
output. The planning report contains all the counter-measures to be applied either 
by the crew or automatically by the system. 
 
The alert report module provides an interface for the user to add attack 
parameters into the network, which remains invisible to the end user. The results 
of the intermediate calculations generated from the alert report are fed into the 
Bayesian network created from expert knowledge, via the BayesiaEngine module 
that provides an application programming interface (API) and a Java library.  
 
The resulting set of counter-measures varies according to the situation. This 
creates a need to set an activation threshold in order to only activate those 
measures that provide the most relevant response at a particular time and in a 
particular situation. It was decided to set this threshold at 70% (i.e. the response 
planning report would only contain those counter-measures where one of its 
modalities had a probability greater than 70%). The figure was arrived at by 
domain experts as it reflects what actually happens in more than two-thirds of 
actual scenarios. 
 
Once the counter-measures have been selected, they are added to the planning 
report in a specific order. The main factors determining this order of priority are: 
the action mode of the counter-measure, its ease of implementation, the degree of 
automation or the need for a large number of crew to activate it, the time 
required for it to become effective and its potential additional functions. 
 
The SARGOS system can handle multiple threats contained in a single alert 
report. The first target to be treated is always the one with the lowest ranking 
(i.e. the threat will reach it first) as it is most exposed to the threat. The planning 
report is then divided into two parts: the first concerns communication and the 
request for assistance broadcast to the entire oil field, and the second concerns 
the specific target at risk. In both cases, the counter-measures to be activated are 
displayed in chronological order (Figure 5). 
 
In the example shown in Figure 5 the global counter-measures are, in order: 
inform the crew master, request the intervention of the security vessel and 
broadcast information about the attack to other installations in the field. The 
specific measures are: assemble the crew, block access to the infrastructure, 
activate searchlights and activate the noise cannon (Long Range Acoustic 
Device; LRAD). The representation of the probability that a particular measure 
will be implemented can be seen in the counter-measure ‘Security Vessels’, 
where the proportion of the blue segment suggests a 60-70% probability that this 
method will be called upon.  
 
Bouejla A., Chaze X., Guarnieri F. et Napoli A., 2012 : 
« Bayesian Networks in the Management of Oil Field Piracy Risk », 
Conférence internationale Risk Analysis 2012 (8th International Conference on Risk Analysis and Hazard Mitigation), Ile de Brac, Croatie, 
WIT Transactions on Ecology and the Environment (ISSN: 1746-448X, Digital ISSN 1743-3541), 2012
  
Figure 5: The SARGOS user interface showing global (left-
hand side) and specific (right-hand side) 
countermeasures to be deployed 
 
5 Conclusions  
Response planning in the SARGOS system results in the preparation of a 
response planning report based on an intelligent assessment of the alert report. 
The response planning report includes all the information necessary for the 
physical implementation of measures to protect against a threat. 
 
The use of a Bayesian network for response planning is a significant asset for the 
SARGOS system as the network is able to handle all possible combinations of 
threat characteristics and the target under attack (e.g. the environment, crew and 
facility management) and most importantly, it can adapt to changes in the danger 
level of the situation. The network is also able to integrate feedback from attacks 
that have already been managed, which means that the planning module can be 
continuously and iteratively improved. 
 
Finally, in order to improve the modelling of knowledge embedded in the 
Bayesian network, an interesting approach would be to draw upon an appropriate 
ontology [13]. The use of a suitable ontology would make it possible to 
formalise knowledge upstream of the Bayesian network in order to consolidate 
the steps of threat detection and identification. 
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